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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the relationship between inequality and the environ-
ment in a growing economy from a political economy perspective. We consider an
endogenous growth economy, where growth generates pollution and a deterioration of
the environment. Public expenditures may either be devoted to supporting growth or
abating pollution. The decision over the public programs is done in a direct democ-
racy, with simple majority rule. We prove that the median voter is decisive and show
that inequality is harmful for the environment: the poorer the median voter relative to
the average individual, the less she will tax and devote resources to the environment,
preferring to support growth.
∗We wish to thank participants to seminars in the University of Paris-1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, the T2M
2004 meeting, CORE, and especially Rabah Amir, Pierre Pestieau, Katrin Millock and Lionel Ragot for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The ideas expressed here and the remaining errors are of
our own responsibility.
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1 Introduction
The distributive issue associated to the protection of the environment has been widely
studied in the literature, mostly in relation with the so-called ”Environmental Kuznets
Curve”.1 Empirically, Magnani (2000), using cross-section data, shows that there exists a
negative relationship between inequality and public expenditures related to the protection
of the environment. However, this issue has been studied by means of static models of
the economy. But environmental problems are recognized to raise intertemporal trade-
oﬀs and the concern over environmental protection policies must focus on the dynamic
and long-term consequences of any measure. On the other hand, the relationship between
growth and inequality has also been thoroughly studied (see the survey by Aghion, Caroli
and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999)2 but these studies have neglected to include the interplay with
environment issues.
The aim of this paper is to tackle the issue between inequality and environment pro-
tection in the context of a growing economy .3 We do so adopting a political-economic
perspective.4 Basically, we develop the following view: both the protection of the envi-
ronment and the growth process, while potentially conflicting, are major public concerns
in modern polities. In particular, environment protection depends on how much public
resources to devote to it, rather than to other policies aimed at sustaining growth and
consumption. As far as individuals are diﬀerenciated with respect to their capital endow-
ment and more generally wealth, they hold conflicting views on the necessity to protect
the environment, relative to the goal of sustaining growth. In other words, the inequality
schedule (that is the initial distribution of capital among agents) shapes the distribution
of opinions on the trade-oﬀ between growth and environment protection. Through voting,
these opinions are aggregated and lead to a political decision on the allocation of resources
to environment protection. Therefore, inequality impacts on the environment, even when
agents do not diﬀer in their preferences over physical consumption and the environment.
In the economy which we consider, it impacts negatively. Indeed, inequality is harmful
1 See among recent references, Andreoni and Levinson (2001), Magnani (2000) and Torras and Boyce
(1998). For a general survey on environment and growth, see Smulders (1999).
2Empirical studies on this issue lead to conflicting views: Perotti (1996) concluded that cross-country
studies lead to a negative relationship. Later on, panel estimations lead to a positive relationship.
3Magnani (2000) refers to growth as the factor behind diﬀerent levels of aggregate output but she
does not model the growth process and therefore does not tackle the intertemporal trade-oﬀ raised by
environmental policy, that is its impact on the saving decision. Marsiliani and Renström (2000) address
this issue using an overlapping generations model, but they skip diﬃcult questions related to the time-
consistency of the political decisions. Jones and Manuelli (2001) also use an overlapping generations model
to tackle the relationship between pollution and growth in a political setting, but they do not refer to
inequality as the source of conflicts of interest among voters; they instead assume that the old generation
has the power to choose.
4That political institutions matter in the understanding of the relationship between environment and
growth is well illustrated by Earnhart (1997), comparing environment protection policies under communism
and democracy.
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to the environment: the more unequal a society (in a sense which will be made more precise
below), the more resources will be used to sustain growth despite its negative impact on the
state of the environment.5 As a result, there is an inverse relationship between the concern
for the environment and the growth rate chosen by the polity. We consider a growing
economy with two central features. First, public expenditures contribute to growth, as in a
AK endogenous growth model with productive public good. Second, aggregate production
pollutes and deteriorates the state of the environment in a way which is detrimental to
any one’s utility since the environment is a pure public good in this economy. However,
an active public policy is able to improve the environment: by devoting public resources
to the protection of the environment, the government can fight oﬀ the adverse eﬀects of
growth on the environment. This obviously raises a public dilemma: how much resources
to devote to the adverse goals of growth and environment protection?
The solution to this dilemma depends on how much the polity values the quality of its
environment relative to its material well-being linked to consumption of physical goods.
Assuming identical utility functions the arguments of which are the state of the environment
and physical consumption, each agent in this economy views this trade-oﬀ according to her
own wealth.6 We find that the wealthier (relative to the mean initial capital endowment)
an agent, the more she is in favor of taxation, in particular for the sake of depollution
activities. This suggests that inequality matters a lot for the solution to this trade-oﬀ. In
other words, there are conflicting views among individuals and the trade-oﬀ facing the
entire polity can only be solved by means of a political decision.7
The quality of the environment is a pure public good. This may justify the use of public
spending for environment improvement. On the other hand, when public resources are used
to productive purposes, it uplifts the productivity of capital and labor, hence their marginal
remunerations, in any period and thus, it increases the rate of growth. The marginal
benefits of growth-enhancing public spending are larger, the poorer an agent is. A poorer
agent faces a steeper trade-oﬀ between a marginal improvement of the environment and a
marginal reduction in consumption. On the whole, standard economic and environmental
issues are related and linked to inequality as agents with diﬀerent endowments perceive
diﬀerently this trade-oﬀ.
5Admittedly, the relationship between pollution and growth is not simple to assess. There are many
types of pollutants and many sources of growth, including R&D which may lead to the use of more
environment-friendly technologies. However what we have in mind is the debate on global warming.
There is much evidence that the man-made industrialization process leads to a significant increase in CO2
emissions, adversely aﬀecting world climate and welfare. See for example Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995).
6That is, contrary to Magnani (2000), we do not assume that wealthier agents are characterized by a
larger weight given to the state of the environment.
7Empirical studies support this view. Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) show that the environment is found
to be a normal good for most people, except those with very high incomes. They stress that income and
price can explain most of the variation in voting; there is little need to introduce "preference" variables
such as political ideology.
3
Applying the majority decision making rule to the political resolution of the trade-
oﬀ we have just mentioned, readily leads us to our conclusion. The poorer the median
voter, the more she cares about material well-being, the more she is willing to channel
public resources to the sustaining of growth and the less she will devote resources to the
restoration of the environment altered by economic growth.8 The more unequal a society,
for a given amount of initial wealth, the more resources will be devoted to the upholding
of growth and therefore the more degraded will be the environment.9
In the next section, we develop the model of a growing economy with environment. In
section 3, we address the political decision to be taken over the protection of the environ-
ment. The last section concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we set up the model of an economy where growth has an adverse influence
on the environment. Pollution is a direct consequence of production10 and public resources
can either sustain growth or improve the environment. Infinitely lived agents care both
about their consumption profile and the state of the environment over time.
Individuals diﬀer in their initial endowment of capital. The political decision about
taxation and spending is taken at the beginning of time according to a simple majority
rule. The public budget is balanced at each period. Hence, the polity has to make a
joint decision about the tax rate and the split of public receipts into growth-enhancing
and environment-linked spending. This decision is irrevocable, made before any capital
accumulation decision and will be applied at each period. When this decision is reached,
each individual acts as an intertemporal utility-maximizer, taking the public decision as
given and decides about her intertemporal saving schedule.
2.1 Production
The production function is similar to that of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), which is adapted
from Barro (1990). A public good GY is produced by government and contributes to
production in addition to capital and labor. The aggregate production function is
Y = AKα(GY )
1−αL1−α (1)
8 In this paper, when we refer to "poorer" or "wealthier" agents, it is based on their initial endowment,
and relative to the average initial endowment. That is why we stress inequality rather than (absolute)
poverty.
9 So this paper is related to the literature on the political economy of redistribution (See Roberts, 1977,
and Meltzer and Richards, 1981). Some papers have cast the issue of redistribution within an endogenous
growth model (see Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Fiaschi, 1999, Kempf and Rossignol, 2005). Here we use a
similar framework to address the trade-oﬀ between growth and environment protection.
10Alternatively, pollution could be linked to consumption expenditures. In our balanced-growth model
with no transition to the steady-state, this does not entail any major diﬀerence.
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where K represents aggregate capital and L aggregate labor. The factors are remunerated
at their marginal productivity:
r =
∂Y
∂K
=
αY
K
and bw = ∂Y
∂L
=
(1− α)Y
L
(2)
then rK + bwL = αY + (1− α)Y = Y.
There are N agents in the economy (N odd). At time 0, each agent is endowed with a
given quantity of initial capital ki (0) , and ki (0) 6= kj (0) , for any i 6= j. There are no two
identical endowments. Without loss of generality, we rank individuals according to their
endowments: ki (0) < kj (0) , for any i < j. An agent is characterized by a median initial
capital endowment, denoted by km.
The total public spending is G = GY +GE , where GY represents the public spending
contributing to production, and GE the amount of public spending against pollution. The
product is taxed to finance public spending: G = τY.11 We denote by τY the part of the
tax which finances GY , and τE the part of the tax which finances GE. It means that
GY = τY Y , and GE = τEY . We denote by τ = τE + τY the overall tax rate. We
restrict τ ∈ (0, 1) as the overall tax rate τ cannot be bigger than 1. According to (1), the
public good GY cannot be negative, hence τY > 0. τE can be either positive or negative,
which implies that τE > 0 corresponds to the case of a policy aiming at protecting the
environment, τE ≤ 0 corresponds to the case where the environment is depleted for the
sake of growth. Here, we focus on the former case. In brief, the public decision amounts
to choosing a pair of tax rates (τE, τY ) . This pair will be applied at any period.12
Inserting the relation GY = τY Y in equation (1), we get:
Y = AKα(τY Y )
1−αL1−α = AKα(τY L)
1−αY 1−α (3)
which is equivalent to:
Y = A1/αK(τY L)
(1−α)/α (4)
We normalize labor (L = 1), thus:
Y = A1/ατY
(1−α)/αK (5)
Using (2), we get:
r = αA1/ατY
(1−α)/α and bw = (1− α)A1/ατY (1−α)/αK. (6)
11Here we diﬀer from Alesina-Rodrik who consider a tax based on capital.
12We shall discuss this assumption in section 3.
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2.2 Quality of environment
We assume that the quality E of the environment (with E ≥ 0) is a decreasing function of
the production Y (because of negative externalities of the production),13 and an increasing
function of the public spending against pollution GE:
E = E(Y,GE) (7)
GE and Y are instantaneous values, that means for example that a quick increase of GE
improves immediately E. In other words, we consider the pollution as a flow, and not as
a stock (see Marrewijk et al., 1993).
We assume that E is a homogeneous function of Y and GE. More precisely, E is
homogeneous of degree 0, which means that E is a function of the ratio GE
Y
= τE. This
homogeneity assumption means that growth is not the “ideal” solution of the environmental
problems, neither ineluctably harmful for the environment.14 Hence we can write:
E = E(τE). (8)
2.3 Individual utility function
The instantaneous utility function of agent i depends on her level of consumption ci and
on the quality of the environment E (which does not depend on the agent i), E ≥ 0. We
assume that this total utility is separable in the physical individual consumption ci and in
the quality of the environment E, since there is no a priori interaction between these two
aspects. It means in particular that it is not a product but a sum:
U(ci, E) = ln(ci) + eV (E) . (9)
Because of (8), we get:
U(ci, E) = ln(ci) + V (τE) (10)
and we assume that the V function is increasing and concave: V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0.
An improvement in the environment improves utility at a decreasing pace. Despite the
separability of this function, we will show that ci depends on τE (cf. (17)).
13For this reason, the environment appears as specific compared to more standard public goods, like
national defense or education, which are not considered as directly adversely aﬀected by the production
process. E equal to zero or negative amounts to an unsuﬀerable environment.
14 If E is homogeneous of degree β, then (7) leads to
∀µ > 0, E(µY, µGE) = µβE(Y,GE)
1. If β > 0, when we multiply Y and GE by a factor µ > 1, then the quality of the environment
is increased by a factor µβ . In particular growth will automatically increase E. We will tend to
ecological heavens.
2. If β < 0, when we multiply Y and GE by a factor µ > 1, then the quality of the environment
decreases. In particular the growth will automatically decrease E. We will tend to ecological hell.
To sum up, if β > 0, any action is useless since the economic growth will solve the ecological problems,
and if β < 0, the growth must be stopped because an indefinite growth would ineluctably harm the
environment.
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2.4 Accumulation decisions and growth
When deciding about saving, an individual takes as given and constant over time the pair
of tax rates. Given (6), the net income of agent i is:
yi = (rki + bwli) (1− τ) (11)
where li is the inelastic labor supply of agent i, equal to L/N = 1/N .
The agent i maximizes her intertemporal utility under budget constraint:
max
ci
W i =
Z +∞
0
e−ρt [ln(ci(t)) + V (τE)] dt (12)
such that k˙i = (rki + bwli) (1− τ)− ci.
Since the tax rate τE and the state of the environment E are beyond the reach of agent i,
the program of agent i becomes:
max
ci
W i =
Z +∞
0
e−ρt ln(ci(t))dt (13)
such that k˙i = (rki + bwli) (1− τ)− ci.
The Hamiltonian of (13) is:
H = ln(ci(t)) + λ [(rki + bwli) (1− τ)− ci] (14)
with ∂H
∂ci
= 1
ci
− λ and ∂H
∂ki
= λr(1− τ).
The solution to (14) is:
∂H
∂ci
= 0
and λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H
∂ki
which leads to λ = 1
ci
and λ˙ = ρλ − λr(1 − τ). Since λ˙
λ
= − c˙i
ci
, finally c˙i
ci
= r(1 − τ) − ρ
obtains.
We assume that we are on a balanced growth path, i.e. c˙i
ci
= k˙i
ki
. The growth rate η is
then given by:
η =
c˙i
ci
=
k˙i
ki
= r(1− τ)− ρ. (15)
Introducing this value in the budget constraint, we get:
k˙i = (rki + bwli) (1− τ)− ci
and:
k˙i
ki
=
1
ki
(rki + bwli) (1− τ)− ci
ki
.
Then:
r(1− τ)− ρ =
µ
r + bw li
ki
¶
(1− τ)− ci
ki
. (16)
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We can note that bw = ωK, setting ω = (1− α)A1/ατ (1−α)/αY . Equation (16) becomes:
r(1− τ)− ρ =
µ
r + ω
Kli
ki
¶
(1− τ)− ci
ki
which implies:
ci =
·µ
r + ω
Kli
ki
¶
(1− τ)− r(1− τ) + ρ
¸
ki
=
·
ρ+ ω
Kli
ki
(1− τ)
¸
ki.
We denote by σi = Kliki =
k
ki
, the ratio of mean capital to the capital owned by agent i. The
set of these ratios characterizes the inequality schedule of this economy. It is independent of
the time since li is constant, and K and ki grow at the same rate η. This is an important
property of this type of model: when tax rates remain constant over time, there is no
modification of relative inequality between agents over time, even though each of them is
getting richer.
The higher σi, the poorer agent i relative to the average capital endowment. We can
rewrite the previous equation as follows:
ci = ρki + ω(1− τ)k = [ρ+ ωσi(1− τ)] ki. (17)
This equation gives the optimal level of consumption of agent i, taking τ as given. ci is of
course an increasing function of ki : the richer agent i, the higher her consumption. Also
quite intuitively, the higher the total tax rate that she bears, the lower her consumption.
Remark that the consumption/capital ratio is an increasing function of σi : for a given
overall tax rate τ , the poorer an individual, the more she consumes relative to her endow-
ment, that is the less she saves. This is in line with the result obtained by Alesina and
Rodrik in their simpler model.
3 The political economy of taxes and the environment
As in Alesina and Rodrik, we impose that tax rates be constant over time and the political
decision on the tax rates (τY , τE) be taken before the accumulation process starts. It is
taken according to majority rule. The timing of the moves is as follows:
1. The endowment schedule {ki (0)}is determined;
2. The political decision is made, according to majority rule, simultaneously on τ iY and
τ iE;
3. Agents choose their saving plans.
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It is important to note that in the context of this model, these assumptions imply that
the relative endowment of agents do not change and therefore the initial median voter
retains this property forever. This ensures the time-consistency of the political decision.15
Despite the multidimensionality of the decision, we show that the generalized median voter
theorem applies in this context. Hence, we first investigate the preferred policy for any
individual, and then address the issue of the political decision itself.
3.1 The preferred tax policy of agent i.
We now search for the preferred tax policy (τ iY , τ
i
E) of agent i, when she takes into account
her reaction function as a private intertemporal maximizer.
This is obtained by solving the following program:
max
τ iY ,τ
i
E
W i =
Z +∞
0
e−ρt [ln(ci(t)) + V (τE)] dt
such that : ci = [ρ+ ωσi(1− τ)] ki.
Since ki grows at the rate η, we know that:
ci = [ρ+ ωσi(1− τ)] ki(0)eηt.
and the program becomes:
max
τY ,τE
W i =
Z +∞
0
e−ρt
£
ln
¡
[ρ+ ωσi(1− τ)] ki(0)eηt
¢
+ V (τE)
¤
dt. (18)
Remark that:
W i =
Z +∞
0
e−ρt [ln (ρ+ ωσi(1− τ)) + ln(ki(0)) + ηt+ V (τE)] dt (19)
=
1
ρ
ln (ρ+ ωσi(1− τ)) +
1
ρ
ln(ki(0)) +
1
ρ2
η +
1
ρ
V (τE) (20)
with η = r(1− τ)− ρ. Thus:
ρW i = ln (ρ+ ωσi(1− τ)) + ln(ki(0)) +
r(1− τ)
ρ
− 1 + V (τE) (21)
where τ = τE + τY , r = αA1/ατ
(1−α)/α
Y , ω = (1− α)A1/ατ
(1−α)/α
Y = (
1−α
α
)r.
We can prove that there exists an identical linear relationship between the tax rates
preferred by any agent i:
Lemma 1 For any agent i, her preferred tax rate pair (τ iE, τ
i
Y ) satisfies a unique linear
relationship:
τ iY + (1− α)τ iE. = (1− α). (22)
15Although not its optimality, compared to the solution obtained if the (identical) median voter were
allowed to vote sequentially at each period. On this point, see Krusell et al. (1997).
9
Proof. see Appendix.
According to this lemma, any individual is facing a dilemma between physical goods and
the environment. She wishes to save and invest, so as to incur higher future consumption.
By the same reasoning, she wants her accumulation eﬀort to be well remunerated. This can
be obtained by channeling some public funds obtained from taxation into the production
sector and not just in depollution activities. On the whole, this accumulation of capital
and this production of goods will deteriorate the environment, relative to its state in
a no production, no public policy economy. Hence, the inverse relationship between both
taxation ratios reflects the trade-oﬀ between future increased consumption and environment
quality.
A key feature of this lemma is that there is unanimity on the linear relation (22)
between τ iY and τ
i
E as this relation does not depend on the capital ratio for agent i,
σi, and therefore is identical for any agent i. Given (22), the political problem becomes
unidimensional and the generalized median voter theorem applies.16 Even though the
choice is made simultaneously on the joint pair of tax rates, it is as if the two tax rates
were chosen sequentially with τ iE being chosen first and then τ
i
Y chosen according to (22).
17
For a given state of the environment, that is a given τ iE, everybody wants to set τ
i
Y so as
to maximize the growth rate, which leads to (22). There is no disagreement on this choice.
The only debate is therefore on the choice of τE. This is decided according to the median
voter theorem.
Hence, given (22), we can replace τY as a function of τE , and concentrate on the choice
of τE.18 Then:
r = αA1/ατ
(1−α)/α
Y = αA
1/α [(1− α)(1− τE)](1−α)/α . (23)
Given (22) and the definition of τ = τY + τE, we immediately get:
1− τ = α(1− τE). (24)
Thus, using (23) and (24), we get:
r(1− τ) = C(1− τE)1/α
where C ≡ α2A1/α(1 − α)(1−α)/α > 0. Here C is treated as a constant insofar as it does
not depend on the policy instruments.
(21) becomes:
ρW i = ln
µ
ρ+
µ
1− α
α
¶
σiC(1− τE)1/α
¶
+ ln(ki(0))+
C(1− τE)1/α
ρ
− 1+V (τE). (25)
16A similar reasoning has been applied by Fiaschi (1999) and Kempf and Rossignol (2005).
17We could present the sequential moves in reverse order, and reason on the choice of τ iY first and then,
the choice of τ iE .
18We could equivalently express τiE as a function of τ iY and concentrate on the choice of the latter rate.
The same results would obtain.
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The environmental policy τ iE preferred by agent i maximizes ρW
i given by (25). To
keep the model analytically tractable, we use the following specification for V (τE):
V (τE) = b
(τE)
1−λ
1− λ , λ 6= 1
V (τE) = b ln(τE), λ = 1
where b > 0, λ > 0. As V (·) is increasing and concave, an increase in the tax rate τE
incrases the quality of the environment and therefore welfare, at a decreasing pace. The
coeﬃcient b corresponds to the relative weight given to the environment. The higher b, the
more an agent values the environment, relative to consumption. Given this specification,
τE has to be positive: we focus on the case where public policy aims at protecting the
environment.19
The following lemma helps us to better understand the trade-oﬀ faced by an agent, and
will be useful later:
Lemma 2 There exists bb > 0 such that:
i/ if b < bb, for any σi, the environmental tax τ iE preferred by agent i is unique, belongs
to (0,bτE ] with bτE = λαλα+1−α < 1 and is decreasing in σi;
ii/ if b > bb, there exists an endowment ratio σ∗ (b) such that any agent i characterized
by σi < σ∗ (b) prefers τ iE = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
The case τE = 1 is a corner solution, meaning that the best solution is to stop produc-
tion. It implies τY = 0, r = ω = 0, GE = τEY = Y = 0, ci = ρki. In this case, each agent
lives in isolation and consumes over time her own initial endowment. According to the first
part of the lemma, there exists a threshold value bb for the environment weight, such that
for any b < bb, even the richest individuals want to save and invest for future production
at the expense of the environment. When the relative weight given to the environment
is low enough, it leads any individual to a compromise between future production and
environment quality. Given the properties of the utility function with b < bb, and a given
pair (τY , τE) , the less endowed an agent, the higher her marginal utility of physical pro-
duction. On the other hand, the marginal utility coming from the environment is the same
for any agent. Hence the poorer an agent, the less she wants to devote public resources
to depollution activities. On the other hand, if b > bb, at least some agents can be so rich
19A negative τE could be considered using a diﬀerent specification of the utility function such as
V (τE) = b
(a+ τE)1−λ
1− λ
, λ 6= 1
V (τE) = b ln(a+ τE), λ = 1,
where a is positive, with a chosen tax rate superior to −a. Results are unchanged when we use this
formulation.
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so as to prefer autarky and no production rather than contributing to the degradation of
the environment, as a side eﬀect of more physical production. Given her endowment, a
relatively rich agent gives a high enough weight to the environment that she prefers to
stop production so as to preserve the quality of the environment. Poorer agents prefer an
intermediate positive value for τE lower than 1. Remark that when b < bb, the richer an
agent, the higher the overall tax rate she wishes. This comes from the inverse relationship
between σi and τ iE, and Lemma 1.
20
3.2 The political decision.
We can now address the issue of the choice of the tax policy when majority rule applies.
We assume that no agent, whatever her relative endowment, prefers to stop production,
that is b < bb. This assumption is plausible given the inescapable evidence of productive
activities through the world. Given the two previous lemmas, we can state the following:
Proposition 3 i/ The median voter chooses a taxation policy such that τmE ∈ (0,bτE ] and
τmY = (1− α)(1− τmE ).
ii/ τmY is an increasing function of σm, whereas τ
m
E and τ
m are decreasing functions of
σm, given that τm = τmY + τ
m
E .
Proof. Part i/ directly comes from applying the generalized median voter theorem (Plott,
1967). As for part ii/ of this proposition, we can see τmE is a decreasing function of σm
since from Lemma 2, τ iE is decreasing in σi. The rest follows according to (22) and (24).
Remember that σm = kkm denotes the capital ratio associated with the median voter.
Part i/ of this proposition states that the median voter is able to decide over fiscal policy.
This comes from the fact that there is an unanimous agreement on the linear relationship
between the two tax rates and the generalized median theorem can apply. Hence the
political decision depends on the ratio σm (see eq.(25)). The ratio σm can be seen as the
politically relevant inequality index in this economy. The higher σm, the more unequal this
economy in a political sense.21 Empirically, the plausible case is σm > 1 (i.e. km < k).
Proposition 3 means that the higher the inequality, the higher τmY , and the lower τ
m
E and τ
m.
In a very unequal society, the political decisionmaking process privileges the production
(τY high) but sacrifices the environment (τE low). Moreover, given (22), τ is equal to
(1 − α) + ατE. Hence it depends positively on τE. This explains that τm is a decreasing
function of σm. A poorer agent tends to give higher weight to her material well-being
20 In the case of no concern for the environment ( b = 0), the solution simplifies to τ iY = (1 − α) and
τ iE = 0, for any agent i. This is similar to the result obtained by Barro (1990).
21Of course, this index does not capture all dimensions of inequality, and ignore the various moments of
the initial capital distribution. The point here is that the political decision hinges on this sole index.
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over time, relative to the environment, than a richer one. Consequently, when confronted
with the issue of taxing and allocating the proceeds of taxes to either a growing pie or an
improved environment, she tends to support both lower taxes and a higher share of the
public budget devoted to growth-enhancing expenditures than to toil at the environment.
The poorer the median voter (that is, the higher σm), the lower τ and τE. Note that these
rates do not depend on the average level of income k, but only on the inequality ratio σm.
Turning to the consequences on growth of this political decision leads to the following:
Corollary 4 The growth rate is an increasing function of σm.
Proof. Immediate since the growth rate η is equal to C (1− τmE )
1/α − ρ
This result directly comes from the property of the growth process. The growth rate is
an increasing function of the share of aggregate product used to enhance the technological
component τY . Hence, the poorer the median voter relative to the average agent, the
more she will channel public expenditures to the growth process. Altogether, this corol-
lary claims that in this economy, there is an inverse relationship between the steady-state
growth rate and the quality of environment, and that this inverse relationship has its roots
in the inequality schedule. This supports the view that it is impossible to disentangle
environmental and productive issues because of inequality: agents with diﬀerent endow-
ments have a diﬀerent appreciation of the trade-oﬀ between physical consumption and the
deterioration of the environment over time.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we address the important issue of the long-term impact of income distribution
on the environment. We claim that income inequality is harmful for the environment in
so far as a concern for a cleaner environment draws public resources away from growth-
enhancing uses. This trade-oﬀ generates a conflict of interest: relatively poor people are
more interested in fostering physical growth at the expense of a clean environment whereas
relatively rich people are more concerned with the quality of the environment and are more
willing to spend for depollution purposes, even if this means a less productive economy in
the long run.
This conflict shapes the political debate and generates the main result of the paper:
the poorer is the median voter, relatively to the average agent in the economy, the more
deteriorated the environment will be, sacrificed to more physical production, that is, higher
growth. Of course, this does not contradict the standard result also obtained from the
model: a richer (aggregate) society takes better care of the environment than a poorer
one as it devotes more aggregate resources (GE) to environment protection. But here, the
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relative weight given to this aim (GE/Y ) does not depend on the aggregate endowment
level of a society but on its distribution.
The model used to obtain the environment is simple. It is based on an AK model of
endogenous growth. Other theories of endogenous growth have been oﬀered in the literature,
based on human capital, on the growth of good variety, or on R&D competition. It would
be worthwhile to incorporate in these theories some environmental features and see whether
they sustain the growth vs environment trade-oﬀ we have been able to exploit here.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1.
We search for the pair (τE, τY )maximizingW i. This implies to solve the following problem:
max
τE
µ
max
τY
¡
W i
¢¶
= max
τY
µ
max
τE
¡
W i
¢¶
. Hence, let’s fix τE and search for the best τY .22
For τE given, to maximizeW i means to maximize
r(1−τ)
ρ
+ln
¡
ρ+ ( 1−α
α
)r(1− τ)σi
¢
. This
is an increasing function of r(1 − τ), thus it is equivalent to search for τY maximizing
r(1− τ) = r(1− τY − τE). We set
f(τY ) = r(1− τY − τE) = αA1/ατ (1−α)/αY (1− τY − τE). (26)
Derivating this function, we get:
f 0(τY ) = αA1/α
·
(
1− α
α
)τ
1
α−2
Y (1− τ)− τ
(1−α)/α
Y
¸
(27)
= αA1/ατ
1
α−2
Y
·
(
1− α
α
)(1− τ)− τY
¸
(28)
Therefore:
f 0(τY ) ≥ 0⇔ τY ≤ (
1− α
α
)(1− τY − τE) (29)
⇔ ατY ≤ (1− α)(1− τY − τE) (30)
⇔ τY ≤ (1− α)(1− τE). (31)
The maximum is attained at τY such that τY = (1−α)(1− τE). We can note that for τE
given, τY = (1−α)(1− τE) maximizes the growth rate η = r(1− τ)−ρ since it maximizes
r(1− τ).
B Proof of Lemma 2.
We are looking for τ iE which maximizes ρW
i(τE), for a given agent i. We assume that
λ 6= 1. The proof is similar when λ = 1.
According to (25), we have
ρW i = ln
³
1 +Di(1− τE)1/α
´
+
C
ρ
(1− τE)1/α + b
τ1−λE
1− λ + const
setting Di ≡
¡
1−α
α
¢
σi
C
ρ
.
We introduce the new variable x = (1− τE)1/α where τE ∈ [0; 1] and x ∈ [0; 1].
Let Ui(x) ≡ ln (1 +Dix) + Cρ x+ b
(1−xα)1−λ
1−λ .
It is clear that τE maximizes W i on [0; 1] if and only if x maximizes Ui (x) on [0; 1].
22We could equivalently use the reverse order of maximization.
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Let U0(x) ≡ Cρ x + b
(1−xα)1−λ
1−λ . Then U0(x) = Ui(x) for Di = 0. This corresponds to
the case of an infinitely rich agent i, when the number of agents is infinite. We deduce:
U 00(x) =
C
ρ
− bα(1− xα)−λxα−1
U0”(x) = −bαxα−2(1− xα)−λ−1 [(λα+ 1− α)xα − (1− α)]
and U0”(x) < 0⇔ x > bx where bx = ³ 1−αλα+(1−α)´1/α ∈ (0; 1). Then
U0 is convex on (0; bx) and concave on (bx; 1). (32)
Before proving Lemma 2, we will first prove that there exists bb ∈ (0;+∞) such that for
any b > 0:
b < bb⇒ max
x∈(0;1]
U0(x) > U0(0) (33)
b > bb⇒ max
x∈(0;1]
U0(x) < U0(0). (34)
Remark that
U0(x) < U0(0)
⇔ C
ρ
x+ b
(1− xα)1−λ
1− λ <
b
1− λ
⇔
C
ρ
x (1− λ)
1− (1− xα)1−λ < b.
Setting bb ≡ maxx∈(0;1] Cρ x h 1−λ1−(1−xα)1−λ i ∈ (0;+∞), we obtain:
- if b < bb, there exists z ∈ (0; 1] such that b < Cρ z(1−λ)
1−(1−zα)1−λ , i.e. U0(z) > U0(0) and (33)
is proved.
- if b > bb, then b > C
ρ
x
h
1−λ
1−(1−xα)1−λ
i
for any x ∈ (0; 1], i.e. U0(0) > U0(x) for any
x ∈ (0; 1] and (34) is proved.
According to (32), U 00 is increasing on (0; bx) and decreasing on (bx; 1). Since lim
x→0
U 00(x) =
−∞ and lim
x→1
U 00(x) = −∞ two cases are possible:
(I) if U 00(bx) ≤ 0 then U 00(x) ≤ 0 for every x ∈ (0; 1);
(II) if U 00(bx) > 0 then there exist x0 and y0 such that:
0 < y0 < bx < x0 < 1 and: U 00(x) > 0 for x ∈ (y0;x0) and U 00(x) < 0 for x /∈ [y0;x0].
We will now prove Lemma 2.
A/ Suppose that b < bb. According to (33), U 00 is not always negative on (0; 1), so (II)
is true. Finally, we have found x0 ∈ (bx; 1) such that U0(x0) > U0(x) for any x ∈ [0; 1] with
x 6= x0.
Similarly, we want to prove that for Di > 0, there exists xi ∈ (bx; 1) such that Ui(xi) >
Ui(x) for any x ∈ [0; 1] with x 6= xi. If x ≤ bx < x0, Ui(x) = U0(x) + ln(1 + Dix) <
U0(x0) + ln(1 +Dix0) = Ui(x0) because U0(x) < U0(x0) and ln(1 +Dix) < ln(1 +Dix0)
since Di > 0. Hence, maxx∈[0;bx] Ui(x) < maxx∈[0;1] Ui(x)
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Since Ui”(x) = U0”(x)− D
2
i
(1+Dix)2
with U0 concave on (bx; 1), then Ui is concave on this
interval too, and finally the maximum of Ui on [0; 1] is attained at a unique point xi, and
xi ∈ (bx; 1).
Let us show that xi is an increasing function of Di. Assume that 0 < Di < Dj .
If x < xi then Uj(x) = Ui(x) + ln
³
1+Djx
1+Dix
´
< Ui(xi) + ln
³
1+Djxi
1+Dixi
´
= Uj(xi) because
Ui(x) < Ui(xi) and ln
³
1+Djx
1+Dix
´
≤ ln
³
1+Djxi
1+Dixi
´
. Hence,maxx∈[0;xi) Uj(x) < maxx∈[0;1]Uj(x),
which implies that xi ≤ xj .
Remark that U 0j(x) =
Dj
1+Djx
− Di1+Dix +U
0
i(x), and U
0
i(xi) = 0 since Ui is maximum at
xi. Then, we have U 0j(xi) =
Dj
1+Djxi
− Di1+Dixi > 0. We conclude that xi < xj .
We have thus proven that, if b < bb, for anyDi > 0, there is a unique xi which maximizes
Ui(x) on [0; 1], and that xi ∈ (bx; 1), xi is an increasing function of Di. According to
our change of variables, it means that Lemma 2 (i) is proven, with τ iE = 1 − xαi , andbτE = 1− bxα = 1− 1−αλα+(1−α) = λαλα+(1−α)
B/ Suppose that b > bb. According to (34), U0(x) < U0(0) for any x ∈ (0; 1]. For Di
small enough, we will have: ∀x ∈ (0; 1], Ui(x) = U0(x) + ln(1 +Dix) < U0(0) = Ui(0). It
means that Lemma 2 (ii) is proven with τ iE = 1− xαi = 1, since here xi = 0, for Di small
enough.
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